Econometric Tools for Detection of Collusion Equilibrium in the Industry

The article presents the notion of detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of choice of the appropriate econometric method, which is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. There has been shown one of the collusion markers coherent with an equilibrium of the proper model of strategic interaction – the presence of structural disturbances in the price process variance for phases of collusion and competition. The Markov Switching Model with switching of variance regimes has been proposed as a proper theoretical method detecting that type of changes without prior knowledge of switching moments. In order to verify the effectiveness of the method it has been applied to a series of lysine market prices throughout and after termination of its manufacturers’ collusion.explicit and tacit collusion, collusive equilibrium, cartel detection, lysine, price variance, Markov switching model.

Testing Parallel Pricing Behavior in the Polish Wholesale Fuel Market: an ARDL – Bound Testing Approach

In this study, we investigated whether the observed series of fuel prices can be compatible with a specific theoretical model of strategic player interaction. Our primary interest is in determining whether a parallel pricing policy, implied by a theoretical model of strategic interactions, can be an industry-observed pricing mechanism. Therefore, we first calculated various descriptive statistics of the price series to discover any common patterns of individual series. Next, we determined whether parallel co-movement of the price levels exist using an ARDL – bound testing approach. This study finds that if we restricted our research to the described pricing mechanism (IPP pricing based on previous day fundamentals), the players will have chosen the levels of price in a parallel mode; this excludes 2007, when LOTOS appeared to be the price leader

SCREENING FOR COMPETITION FAILURES: SOME REMARKS ON HORIZONTAL ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR VISUAL DETECTION

Anticompetitive horizontal behaviors are very common and harmful for economy as a whole and consumer welfare especially. Such behaviors in most cases mean collusion. Pro-active anticompetitive policy we want to realize implies monitoring of huge set of markets and industries. As preliminary selection is possible on a basis of number of factors that enhanced collusion, there could be still big set of industries left. There is a necessity then for methods of collusion’s detection which would be quick, resource — saving and understandable for economists, experts and lawyers without quantitative experience. We described here fairly simple but meaningful, graphical tools which could be used in process of screening for collusive behavior in the markets. We underlined that ability of graphical inspection depends on statistical/econometric tool of choice for particular screen, so we see a need for research and popularization of tools with that property

Econometric Tools for Detection of Collusion Equilibrium in the Industry

The article presents the notion of detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of choice of the appropriate econometric method, which is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. There has been shown one of the collusion markers coherent with an equilibrium of the proper model of strategic interaction – the presence of structural disturbances in the price process variance for phases of collusion and competition. The Markov Switching Model with switching of variance regimes has been proposed as a proper theoretical method detecting that type of changes without prior knowledge of switching moments. In order to verify the effectiveness of the method it has been applied to a series of lysine market prices throughout and after termination of its manufacturers’ collusion

Detection of Collusion Equilibrium in an Industry with Application of Wavelet Analysis

In thepresent paper an attempt was made to verify the possibilities of the use of a marker of structural changes of market price variance in the detection of trade collusion between business players. We used the theoretical model of strategic behaviour of trade players with the assumption of exogenous and time-constant cartel quota (market shares), which justifies the application of a marker for business with specific parameters. The paper contains empirical employment of a marker for a sequence of average Lysine price on the USA market in 1990–1996. Wavelet analysis was applied, for the first time in this context, as the econometric method for the detection of structural changes in the variance.Artykuł zawiera empiryczne zastosowanie markera zmian strukturalnych wariancji procesu ceny rynkowej dla szeregu cen średnich Lysiny na rynku USA w latach 1990–1996. Jako metodę ekonometryczną detekcji zmian strukturalnych w wariancji zastosowano, po raz pierwszy w tym kontekście, analizę falkową. Metoda ta ma w omawianym zakresie aplikacji istotne zalety, takie jak oszczędność w zakresie wymaganych danych statystycznych oraz bardzo dobre własności lokalizacyjne w dziedzinie czasu. W pracy wykorzystano model teoretyczny zachowań strategicznych graczy w branży motywujący zastosowanie wymienionego markera

INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURE OF STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN THE POLISH WHOLESALE FUEL MARKET: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF A MARKET STRUCTURE AND A PRICE MECHANISM

The study is devoted to preliminary analysis of the Polish petroleum industry and the wholesale level of the fuel market in the context of strategic interactions’ research. In the paper, the structure of the Polish petroleum industry (refining sector) and the wholesale level of the market were analyzed, in order to extract every factors influencing the shape of theoretical strategic interaction model. As a result, the key characteristics of the industry, the wholesale market, the players and price creation mechanism have been isolated. Basing on that findings, the Author has pointed to essential elements of the theoretical model of strategic interactions (game model), which can be constructed as a possible model of players’ behavior

Detekcja równowagi zmowy w branży z wykorzystaniem analizy falkowej – model teoretyczny

In this paper a supergame model of collusion based on fixed cartel quota exogenously provided by cartel members’ agreement is developed. The model provides theoretical motivation of price wars and variance screen of collusion. We use the model to explain behavior of well known Lysine conspiracy members. In a second part of a research we will verify usefulness of a variance marker in an empirical example with application of wavelet analysis.W artykule podjęto próbę weryfikacji możliwości wykorzystania markera zmian strukturalnych wariancji procesu ceny rynkowej w detekcji zmowy graczy w branży. W części pierwszej pracy zaproponowano model teoretyczny zachowań strategicznych graczy w branży przy założeniu egzogenicznych i stałych w czasie kwot kartelowych (udziałów w rynku). Model taki może służyć do wyjaśnienia, między innymi, zachowań graczy w branży producentów Lysiny w latach 1990–1996. Model ten teoretycznie wspiera metodę detekcji zmowy opartą na analizie wariancji procesu ceny rynkowej, motywując niższą wariancję w fazie zmowy. Część druga pracy zawiera weryfikację empiryczną zastosowania markera z wykorzystaniem analizy falkowej

Ekonometryczne narzędzia detekcji równowagi zmowy w branży

Detection of overt or tacit collusion is a serious empirical problem. This paper outlines econometric methods of detection collusive equilibrium and focuses on the one which is consistent with equilibrium profile of proper dynamic model of collusion and relatively not data demanding, namely on marker of structural change in price volatility during collusive and competitive phase. As an proper econometric tool of discovery such an phenomenon Markov switching model is proposed. This model with ARMA (p,q) dynamics and switching variance and/or conditional heteroscedasticity in ARCH(∞) form are ex-ante the most consistent with equilibrium profile structure and with players – observer information asymmetry. To verify proposed methodology an application to well known lysine conspiracy has been doneW artykule przedstawiono problem detekcji równowagi zmowy jawnej lub milczącej w kontekście wyboru właściwej metody ekonometrycznej, który determinowany jest ilością informacji posiadaną przez obserwatora. Zaprezentowano jeden z markerów zmowy spójnych z równowagą właściwego modelu interakcji strategicznej – obecność zaburzeń strukturalnych w wariancji procesu ceny dla faz zmowy i konkurencji. Jako poprawną teoretycznie metodę detekcji tego typu zmian bez wiedzy a priori o momentach przełączania zaproponowano wykorzystanie przełącznikowego modelu Markowa z przełączaniem reżimów wariancji. W celu weryfikacji skuteczności metody aplikowano ją dla szeregu cen rynkowych lysiny w czasie trwania i upadku zmowy jej producentów

Detekcja równowagi zmowy w branży z wykorzystaniem analizy falkowej – weryfikacja empiryczna

In this paper we verify usefulness of a variance marker of collusion in an application to Lysine prices during well known cartel/competition episode. As an econometric method of detection of structural change in price volatility during collusive and competitive phase wavelet analysis was applied. This method, relatively new in the context of cartel detection has some attractive features for such an applications. It is not data demanding and has very good localization power in a time domain. Our work was motivated by theoretical supergame model of collusion based on fixed cartel quota exogenously provided by cartel members’ agreement we developed in first part of our work.Artykuł zawiera empiryczne zastosowanie markera zmian strukturalnych wariancji procesu ceny rynkowej dla szeregu cen średnich Lysiny na rynku USA w latach 1990–1996. Jako metodę ekonometryczną detekcji zmian strukturalnych w wariancji zastosowano, po raz pierwszy w tym kontekście, analizę falkową. Metoda ta ma w omawianym zakresie aplikacji istotne zalety, takie jak oszczędność, jeśli chodzi o wymagane dane statystyczne, oraz bardzo dobre własności lokalizacyjne w dziedzinie czasu. Artykuł stanowi kontynuację pracy zawartej w części pierwszej, gdzie zaproponowano model teoretyczny zachowań strategicznych graczy w branży motywujący zastosowanie wymienionego markera

Theoretical Model of Pricing Behavior on the Polish Wholesale Fuel Market

In this paper, we constructed a theoretical model of strategic pricing behavior of the players in a Polish wholesale fuel market. This model is consistent with the characteristics of the industry, the wholesale market, and the players. The model is based on the standard methodology of repeated games with a built-in adjustment to a focal price, which resembles the Import Parity Pricing (IPP) mechanism. From the equilibrium of the game, we conclude that the focal price policy implies a parallel pricing strategic behavior on the market